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CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL DISASTERS: CHALLENGE
TO INTERNATIONAL POLLUTION CONTROL
Recent oil spillage from an offshore oil well in the Santa Barbara
Channel gave headline significance to a potentially major source of
ocean pollution. Oil spillage threatens not only the adjacent shores; the
economic and aesthetic interests of neighboring states and the common
interests of the world community in freely navigable seas, plentiful
food resources, clean air and water, and the survival of rare species of
wildlife lend international dimensions to pollution dangers. While the
solution for licensing states is obvious-those states can impose appropriate regulatory measures-no protection is afforded the other parties
in interest. New international action may be needed to protect the
world community from the increasing dangers of oil pollution.
I
THE

BACKGROUND

A. The Channel Oil Spill
The commercial exploitation of oil and gas reserves in the Santa
Barbara Channel' was record-setting. The sale by the federal government of petroleum leases-many for tracts wholly or partly beyond the
600-foot and 1,200-foot bathymetric lines in deep water previously considered unexploitable-brought the largest total amount,2 the largest
amount for a single tract,3 and the highest per-acre price4 ever received
I The islands delineating the Santa Barbara Channel are approximataly 30 miles offshore. See maps in Armstrong, Santa Barbara Channel Action Continues at Brisk Pace,
66 O. 9- GAS J., April 29, 1968, at 119; Channel Sale Swamps Offshore Records, 66 Om.
& GA J., Feb. 12, 1968, at 66 [hereinafter cited as Channel Sale].
2 The high bids finally accepted by the federal government as an aggregate sales price
totaled $603,204,284. The total amount of money that was offered in the bidding was
$1,293,601,113. The highest previous total of offers was $1.6 billion for Gulf of Mexico
leases the previous year, which were finally sold for $93,125,000 (for 158 tracts as opposed
to 75 in the Santa Barbara Channel). Channel Sale 66. The total value to the federal
treasury in 1968 of rentals, royalties, and bonus payments on the channel concessions was
reportedly $1.6 billion. Ti~tE, Feb. 14, 1969, at 23.
3 The lease was awarded to a 4-company group of bidders, headed by Union Oil
Company, for a record-setting $61,418,000, nearly twice the amount of the previous high
bid for a federal lease. Channel Sale 66. The same group paid $56,378,000 for another
lease in the vicinity. Many other tracts in the offering brought 8-figure prices; some exceeded $40,000,000. Id. See also Christy, Marine Resources and the Freedom of the Seas,
8 NATuRAL Rrsourcas J. 424, 427 (1968).
4 Channel Sale 66.
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for an offshore lease-sale. The Secretary of the Interior had not heeded
the warnings of local conservationists5 who were concerned for the
Channel's natural beauty and troubled by the area's unique geological
formations, including a thrust fault through Tract 402. 6 On January
28, 1969, during the withdrawal of a drill bit to replace a worn part,
7
the premier successful well on Tract 402 suffered a severe blowout.

Although the initial blowout was capped by forcing drilling "mud"
down the hole, the intense pressure forced both oil and gas through
fissures into the sea.8 A drilling moratorium imposed by the Secretary
of the Interior 9 was brief,10 and a new leak emerged in the vicinity of
5 Timm, Feb. 14, 1969, at 23. Their concern increased when oil slicks began to appear
along the coast after drilling commenced. The Secretary of the Interior refused a proposed
extension of the 2-mile drilling buffer zone contiguous to state waters, to which the government had already agreed; had this zone been created, Tract 402 would have been in it.
Such delays of the lease date as the Secretary deemed necessary to placate the local
conservationists created disgruntled opposition among the prospective offshore operators.
Armstrong, Leasing Delay Hurting Offshore CaliforniaIndustry, 65 OIL & GAS J., Nov. 20,
1967, at 150. This article noted the growing anxiety among oil men about losses in revenues while a 60-day delay permitted a thorough study of the area by complaining conservationists. Id. at 150-53. See also Added Santa Barbara Sale Curbs Rapped, 65 OIL &
GA J., Dec. 4, 1967, at 40. Noting the loss of $100 million in bonuses in the 2-mile buffer
zone and the $500 million "sacrifice" in future royalties, it was asserted that Secretary of
Interior "Udall has gone the second mile with local protestants .. . . Id.
6 Armstrong, supra note 1, at 119. This problematical physical structure of the subsoil was to figure prominently in the difficulty in controlling the blowout and resulting
pollution.
7 "[A] drill had cut a hole into a high-pressure deposit of oil and gas. Withdrawing
the drill to renew the worn bit was like pulling a cork out of a bottle." N.Y. Times,
Feb. 2, 1969, § 1,at 54, col. 2.
8 Id. See also TiME, Feb. 14, 1969, at 24.
Following an inspection, the Secretary of Interior concluded that there was a "lack of
sufficient geological knowledge about the area." 67 OIL & GAs J., Feb. 17, 1969, at 43.
Normally, safety standards of the crews would have controlled the situation; however, the
channel is unique. "Here, faults and folds have created a crazy-quilt pattern of geology.
Some of the shallow sands outcrop on the ocean floor, and oil seeps are not uncommon."
Huge Channel Oil Spill Blows Up Storm, 67 OIL & GAS J, Feb. 10, 1969, at 50. See diagram in N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1969, § 4, at 2, col. 5.
9 N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1969, at 1, col. 2. The Secretary did not order a total suspension.
although he had the authority to do so. Instead, he preferred to handle the problem on a
voluntary basis with the industry. Noting compliance with federal standards by the drillers,
he observed that the pollution was "'as much the fault of the Government as anyone.'"
Id. at 78, col. 1. He admitted that tighter drilling regulations had not been promulgated
despite the knowledge that geological conditions were unstable. N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1969,
§ 1, at 1, col. 3.
10 Resumption of drilling brought a storm of protest in opposition to the leases.
"[R]esidents . ..expressed great concern that the continental shelf exploitation-of little
local economic value-would besmirch the renowned beauty of the affluent beach community .... " N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1969, § 1, at 1, col. 2. Rage at the runaway well, which
covered 40% of the 200-square-mile channel with oil in 5 days, generated threats to burn
oil credit cards. Id. A county official called the brief drilling moratorium "tokenism in its
worst form" and recalled that Department of Interior officials "hell bent" on leasing the

1969]

INTERNATIONAL POLLUTION CONTROL

Platform A on Tract 402.11 Vast oil slicks washed ashore, 12 covering
white sand beaches with a two-inch thick layer of crude oil. The harbor and marina in Santa Barbara were fouled, and 750 small boats
were soiled. 8
B. The Promise of the Shelf
The potential recovery of mineral and biological wealth from ocean
14
waters and the seabed offers significant opportunities and rewards.
Although many minerals-such as phosphorite and manganese-are not
presently well-situated for economic exploitation, 15 offshore deposits of
oil and gas are becoming increasingly accessible. Submarine areas near
land masses will rapidly become important sources of world petroleum.16
Although undersea petroleum recovery is currently unprofitable
in the deeper areas and represents only a small percentage of on-land
production, rapid progress in offshore developments in the past two
decades17 has markedly increased that share as concern over the eventracts had given assurances that there was no danger of pollution. N.Y. Times, Feb. 6,
1969, at 19, col. 1.
11 N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1969, at 50, col. 2. The seepage was reported to be a bleedingoff from oil-saturated sands on the bottom. Id.
12 The oil coated 400 square miles of the ocean's surface and stained 40 miles of
frontage along some of the area's finest shoreline. See map, TIME, Feb. 14, 1969, at 24.
Is TimE, Feb. 14, 1969, at 23-25; N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1969, at 1, col. 2.
The Office of the Attorney General of the State of California announced that it
would sue on behalf of all damaged parties. TIME, Feb. 14, 1969, at 24. A $500 million
claim was flied with the Department of Interior against the Federal Government, and a
$560 million damage suit was instituted in Santa Barbara Superior Court against the
Union consortium. N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1969, at 1, col. 3. The Secretary of Interior announced that oil companies would be held responsible for cleaning up pollution from
offshore drilling, regardless of the absence of any showing of fault. In this first major
regulatory step since the incident, he announced that the federal government would
police oil spills when private companies failed and recover the costs in federal court.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1969, at 1,col. 2.
R. CARSON, THE SEA ARiOUND US 193 (1961).
15 See Tan AMmCAN ASSEMBLY, USES OF TiE SEAS 83, Table 2 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as UsES oF THE SEAs].
16 M. McDOUGAL & W. BuRKE, THE PusLic ORDER OF THa OCEANs 631, 632 (1962) [here14

inafter cited as McDouGAI, & BuRmE]. Estimates of submarine oil reserves range from 1,000
billion barrels (id. at 570) to 1,400 billion barrels. N.Y. Times, June 9, 1968, § 3, at 1,
col. 4. It is possible the United States continental shelf may contain 100 billion barrels
and the Gulf of Mexico shelf alone 22 billion barrels. Compare this with one estimate of
world on-land reserves of 50 billion barrels. McDouGAL & Buaan 570-71.
It has been suggested that atomic energy will eventually replace other fuel sources.
As of 1970, however, this source is expected to account for only 1% of world energy requirements. Id. at 631 n.210.
17 The world value of sea-floor production of selected minerals in 1964 was $3.8
billion, 10% of the value of the same minerals produced on land and about 5% of onland production of all minerals. UsES or Tan SEAs 33. In the same year United States off-

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:113

tual depletion of land reserves has mounted. Scientific advances are
already making exploitation operations possible at depths of up to
6,000 feet of water, 8 and manned underwater stations are potentially
useful for drilling and exploring sites in shallower areas.' In a single
decade the United States petroleum industry has invested $7 billion
domestically and $3 billion in foreign operations in underwater devel20
opment; estimates for the next decade run as high as $25 billion.
Areas where oil has been found or is likely to be found which have
been opened or projected for commercial exploration are increasing
rapidly.2 1 At present, the major areas of production are the Persian
Gulf, the Gulf of Mexico off Louisiana, and Lake Maracaibo in Veneshore oil and gas production was $800 million as opposed to $10,500 million on-land
production; world offshore recovery was $3.6 billion as opposed to $27.5 billion on-land
production. Id. at Table 2. Offshore production in the United States had increased more
than 35% to $1100 million 2 years later. Id. at 2. This, it must be remembered, was still
prior to the Santa Barbara leases.
18 In 1967 a platform was used in the North Sea that was capable of sinking a drill
15,000 feet into the bottom while floating in 600 feet of water. Oil reserves in deeper
water of the continental slope may eventually be drilled with underwater robots and deep
saturation diving. Id. at 2.
Some consider drilling possible in water up to 5,000 feet, and the Department of Interior has granted exploration permits at depths exceeding that on the continental slope
and has indicated an interest for lease purposes in depths off California of as much as
6,000 feet. NPC to study leasing beyond Shelf, 66 On. & GAS J., Feb. 5, 1968, at 112.
In 1968 in two and a half miles of water the oceanographic ship Glomar Challenger
discovered that some of the Gulf of Mexico sediments forming the deepest part of the sea
floor known as the "abyssal plain" were oil-bearing. The discovery is believed to be the
first at depths greater than those of the continental shelf. The find, approximately halfway between Louisiana and the Yucatan Peninsula, may have opened up a "very important
petroleum province." N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1968, at 45, col. 3.
19 N.Y. Times, June 9, 1968, § 3, at 1, col. 4. Manned stations under the sea may be
able to pump oil into "massive dirigible-shaped, flexible skin undersea barges" for transport to the surface or shore. For an artist's conception of an underwater train of such
barges, each of which could hold 80-120 million barrels of oil, see M. CArom, HYDROSPAcE
107 (1964). As to the potential effect of these innovations on the danger of pollution:
This eliminates the necessity of pipelines that must lead to the surface-and also
frees the operations from most of the problems that would be encountered, such
as high waves, storms, winds, temperature extremes, positioning and holding the
vessels on the surface to receive the oil, and so forth.
Id. at 105.
One of the major United States oil companies has tested "Mobot," an underwatdr
robot that can swim, hear, see, and work deep on the ocean floor. The robot can be di.
rected to turn on a valve and regulate the flow of oil or make repairs. Using Mobot and
a surface drilling rig, the company discovered a natural gas well off the Santa Barbara
area. Machinery and pipes for bringing the gas ashore were set up by remote control.
P. BaOS, WATER THE VIRAL EssEucE 107 (1967).
20 McDouoAL & BuxE 570; USES OF THE SEAS 44.
21 See map, UsES OF THE SEAs 43, Figure 3; Gardner, Offshore oil industry big, getting
bigger, 66 On. & GAS J, April 22, 1968, at 133.
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zuela, each of which produces nearly one million barrels per day. 22
23
Other areas include Australia, which has limited production on land,
Saudi Arabia, 24 and the coast of the Portuguese West African enclave
of Cabinda. 25 The State of Alaska has leased or soon will lease much
of its continental shelf; 26 Argentina has granted exploration permits
for large blocks in offshore areas;2 7 and the Netherlands has leased a
substantial number of tracts for offshore drilling in its segment of the
North Sea shelf.28
C. The Torrey Canyon and OtherFactualP'ecedents
The drilling mishaps on the continental shelf exploded in a context of increasing domestic and international concern with ocean pollution. The Channel incident raised the specter of a notorious marine
disaster that occurred two years earlier, the grounding of the giant oil
tanker Torrey Canyon off the southwest tip of Cornwall, England. 29
The grounded ship eventually broke in two and lost large quantities of
her immense cargo of oil,3o which, driven by storm winds, eventually
polluted 140 miles of coast. The British Government, alarmed at the
continuing influx of petroleum on the waves, dispatched several planes
from the Royal Air Force to bomb the broken hull and set the oil
31
afire.
32
The Torrey Canyon was the largest ship ever to run aground,
but the pollution problem in ocean transport is not limited to major
SEAs 44.
22 Usas OF THnE
23

Id.

McDoUGAL & BuRKE 571.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1967, at 61, col. 5.
65 OIL & GAs J., July 3,1967, at 44. Federal areas to be leased are in 5,000 to 6,000
water and range from 30 to 90 miles from the coast.
27 66 OIL & GAs J., March 11, 1968, at 68.
28 Three areas hog Dutch bidding, 67 OIL & GAs J., Nov. 27, 1967, at 62; Gardner,
Dutch awardNorth Sea blocks, 66 OIL & GAs J., March 11, 1968, at 65.
29 See generally J. MABn=, LA MARkE NoIM DU Tommy CANYON (1967); Nanda, The
"Torrey Canyon" Disaster: Some Legal Aspects, 44 DENWR L.J. 400 (1967). The Torrey
Canyon is a law professor's examination question dream because of the jurisdictional
issues involved. The ship was of Liberian registry, owned by an American corporation,
chartered by a British corporation, and piloted by an Italian captain. The wreck took
place on the high seas outside the territorial limits of the United Kingdom. See Nanda,
supra, at 401.
80 The British navy estimated that 36 million gallons, or half of the original cargo
of 118,000 tons of oil, were released. N.Y. Times, March 28, 1967, at 1, col. 5.
81 The detonations set the sea ablaze for a mile around. The dilemma of the final
disposition of any pollutant was illustrated by the mile-high column of smoke that arose
over the wreck, raining soot-like.particles on the ocean surface. N.Y. Times, March 29,
1967, at 1, col. 3.
82 N.Y. Times, March 25, 1967, at 1, col. 7; id. March 27, 1967, at 1, col. 6.
24
25
26
feet of
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frequently, 8

wrecks. Less publicized accidents occur
and the total
volume of world tanker tonnage, as well as the size of individual vessels,
continues to grow.34 Furthermore, although much pollution does result
from accidents, a great deal of it is the consequence of deliberate or
negligent spillages from washing or "ballasting" of tanks by both tankships and passenger and dry cargo vessels. 3 Much of this oil, regardless
of origin, finds its way to shorelines, where, especially in cold climates,
it may persist for years. 36
33 The breakup of the tanker Tampico off Southern California in 1957 poured 59,000
barrels of oil into the sea with disastrous consequences for marine life in the area. Tnw,
Feb. 14, 1969, at 23. The ruptured tanks of the Liberian-registered World Glory spilled
46,000 tons of oil that formed a 70-mile-long slick 10 miles off South Africa. Aircraft
fought the slick with chemical dispersants. N.Y. Times, June 17, 1968, at 77, col. 8. The
Japanese Maritime Safety Agency reported 16 accidents involving tankers of 10,000 tons
or more between 1962 and 1967, 7 in Tokyo Bay. N.Y. Times, July 26, 1967, at 77, col. 3.
Replacement of tanker shipment with pipelines, which expose the surrounding waters
to pollution from escaping oil in event of damage from internal and external causes, is
an additional source of concern. In 1967 the 84,593-ton Liberian-registered Constantine,
while waiting in an English harbor to unload 52,000 tons of Kuwait crude oil, struck a
jetty and ruptured nearby pipelines, causing tons of crude oil to cascade into the Mersey
River. N.Y. Times, July 12, 1968, at 62, col. 7. Almost concurrently with the Santa Barbara
Channel disaster, the Union Oil Company was accused of dumping 1,500 barrels of crude
oil into a river after a mud slide broke a pipeline. TiasE, Feb. 14, 1969, at 23, 24. One
writer noted of a planned 80-mile pipeline that will carry 150,000 barrels per day that
"[t]he prospect of a break in a high pressure submerged oil pipeline where offshore winds
prevail is enough to make any coastal nation uneasy, particularly in view of the Torrey
Canyon disaster." Luce, The Development of Ocean Minerals and the Law of the Sea,
NATURAL R-souRcxs LAw., July 1968, at 29, 32. Such pipelines will probably become common fixtures in areas of massive offshore operations such as those in the Gulf of Mexico
and the Santa Barbara Channel.
34 World tonnage more than tripled from 1946 to 1966. N.Y. Times, May 14, 1967,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 24. Future projections are:
1973: 1554 million long tons
1983: 8354 million long tons
2003: 6061 million long tons
66 On. & GAS J., Aug. 26, 1968, at 41.
35 As a ship's tanks empty through fuel consumption, the ship takes on water in the
tanks as ballast to maintain balance and seaworthiness. As the ship approaches port, the
ballast, no longer needed, is ejected, and an oily mixture is spread upon the water. F.
GRAHAM, DISASTER BY DEFAULT 156 (1966).
36 Id. at 154. Some members of the industry have sought refuge in allegations that
broken hulls of sunken allied tankers of World War II produce oil slicks along the Atlantic Coast. Id. at 156. The magnitude of any pollution threat posed by these vessels is
probably exaggerated, however. Id. See also the results of a Coast Guard sampling of
sunken tankers, in N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1967, at 82, col. 1; id. Aug. 18, 1967, at 65, col. 7;
id. Aug. 23, 1967, at 89, col. 5. In fact the source of many slicks can never be traced with
finality. See WATER CONTROL NEws, June 5, 1967, at 1; N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1967, at 29,
col. 4; id., June 3, 1968, at 5, col. 3.
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D. Pollution'sThreat to the Environment
The most serious impact of ocean pollution is its harmful effect on
the life-giving abilities of the sea upon which man must increasingly
depend. Oil-stained beaches make unaesthetic, malodorous, and unpleasant recreation grounds; oil slime on pleasure boats and piers is a.
costly nuisance. These inconveniences, however, can be remedied. It is
the often lasting and unpredictable toll on the sea's living resources
37
that is the crippling outcome of pollution.
The Santa Barbara Channel was renowned as a haven for birds and
mammals. Their continued existence was imperiled by the thick oil
scum which spread over the surface and by the chemicals employed to
fight the oil. 38 Sea birds diving for food in the slick often either failed
to surface or floated ashore to die, 9 their feathers soaked with oil.
There was apprehension that the oil would endanger hundreds of grey
whales that swim through the channel annually en route to their breeding lagoons in Baja, California. 40 The excessive accumulation of oil and
chemicals, even if broken up or sunk, will create residual long-term
damage to the ecological balance of the entire area. 41
More perilous than the harm suffered by a single species of
wildlife is the possibility that interruption of the food chain in the
oceans could destroy generations of marine life.42 Many minor plant
37 Early reports of the confrontation after the Santa Barbara disaster between the
president of Union Oil Company and investigating senators had the executive saying,
"I'm amazed at the publicity for the loss of a few birds." N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1969, at 19,
col. 1. The statement was later denied. An Assistant Secretary of Interior for Fish and
Wildlife has suggested a permanent moratorium on "worn-out interrogatory phrases such
as 'What's more important-ducks or people?' In defending human values in natural
resources, he said, 'I am not here today to represent salmon, whooping cranes, or redwood
trees. When I voice concern for fish and wildlife I am representing people."' WATrE CONTROL NAVs, July 16, 1968, at 8.
38 "The fouled waters threatened thousands of rookeries on the Santa Barbara Islands
haven for the sea elephant, the Guadalupe fur seal (once thought extinct) and the rare sea
otter." TImE, Feb. 14, 1969, at 28. See also LiFE, June 13, 1969, at 22. But see TIME,
June 13, 1969, at 21.
89 TIME, Feb. 14, 1969, at 23. Birds encumbered with sticky oil cannot fly; those that
clean their feathers swallow it and are poisoned. N.Y. Times, March 29, 1967, at 1, col. 4.
40 Nearly 30 of the 40-foot long animals were sighted surfacing in the tainted water
attempting to breathe. N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1969, at 46, col. 1 (city ed.).
41 N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1969, § I, at 1, col. 2.
42 "[R]esearch done by scientists after Britain's oil tanker disaster in March [1967]
showed that spilled oil killed about 30 percent of the tiny organisms on which fish feed.
The detergents used to remove the oil were even worse, killing 96 percent of these creatures." Water Pollution-1967, pt. 1, Hearings on S. 1591 and S. 1604 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Public Works Comm., 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 10 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Water Pollution Hearings].
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and animal species not directly exploitable by man support higher
forms of life which can be.fished or raised commercially. 43 Commercial fishermen in the Santa Barbara area, for instance, claim that
fishing in the channel might be ruined for years because the sludge
will kill anchovies, which act as bait to draw larger predatory species
of fish and other marine life into the grounds. 44 Changes in the
environment of the oceans may affect man even more drastically.
The world may find itself increasingly turning to the sea for portions
of its water supply,4 5 and the earth's atmosphere may be adversely
affected by changes in the oceans' plant population. Tiny plants in
the seas produce more than seventy percent of the oxygen present in
the atmosphere at any one time, and continuing pollution of the
40
oceans may be a major factor in oxygen depletion.
II
ExISTING

APPROACHES TO REGULATION

AND THEmI

LIMITATIONS

A. United States Efforts
The United States has had federal legislation covering oil spillage
48
since the end of the last century.47 The laws are strictly enforced;
48 The basic building blocks of the food chain are the plankton, microscopic forms
of animal and plant life that are the basic food upon which all higher forms depend.
These organisms thrive in the coastal and estuarine waters of the continental shelf. The
shallow waters are spawning grounds for shellfish and crustaceans as well as many species
of fish and a feeding ground for still other species. It is on the shallow, relatively welllighted shelves that the basic biology of the sea is created, rather than in the dark and
forbidding depths. "Plant life in the sea never extends below an average depth of 300 feet,
the approximate limit of sunlight sufficient to allow the process of photosynthesis ....
[I]t is in the thin upper level that life is established .
CAmIN, supra note 19, at 147.
44 N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1969, at 1, col. 2.
45 Rienow S_Rienow, The Oil Around Us, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1967, § 6 (Magazine),
at 24, 111 [hereinafter cited as The Oil Around Us].
46 "Suppose [the Torrey Canyon] . . . had been carrying a concentrated herbicide

instead of petroleum. Would it have stopped photosynthesis in the North Sea?" WATm
CONTROL NzWs, Jan. 2, 1968, at 5.
47 The earliest of these was the Refuse Act, section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act
of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1964). The Refuse Act is administered by the Corps of Engineers;
the Oil Pollution Act of 1961 is administered by the Secretary of Transportation; the Oil
Pollution Act of 1924 is administered by the Secretary of Interior.
48 In United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966), the Court ruled that
accidental discharge of aviation gas into a navigable river violated Section 13 of the Rivers
and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1964), despite defendants' contention that commercially valuable oil products could not be termed "refuse" within the terms of the section. A comparably broad construction of the section was employed to impose liability
for spillage from a tank farm on land into coastal waters, despite defendant's objections
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however, the major statute, the Oil Pollution Act of 1924,49 provides
insufficient protection. Under amendments contained in the Clean
Waters Restoration Act of 1966,50 the term "discharge"--originally
intended to cover any escape of off-is defined as "grossly negligent,
or willful spilling"'51 of oil. Because of its wording, the 1924 Act is
extremely difficult to enforce.5 2 Another statute, the Oil Pollution
Act of 196 1,5 provides more stringent regulation but applies only
54
to sea-going ships of American registry.
that the statute did not apply to sources so remote from the sea. United States v. Esso
Standard Oil Co. of Puerto Rico, 375 F.2d 621 (3d Cir. 1967).
In interpreting the Oil Pollution Act of 1924, the court in United States v. LeBeouf
Bros. Barge Co., 368 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1966), ruled that the unavoidable accident defense
(43 U.S.C. § 433 (1964)) should be narrowly construed and held that where a history of
leakage and unseaworthiness was demonstrated, even small amounts of spillage would be

sufficient to create responsibility. 368 F.2d at 222.
49 Ch. 316, § 7, 43 Stat. 605 (1924), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 433(a) (Supp. HI, 1968).
50 Section 211(a) of the Oil Pollution Act of 1924, as amended, forbids:

[e]xcept in case of emergency

...

or unavoidable accident, collision, or stranding

any person to discharge or permit the discharge from any boat or vessel of
oil ... into or upon the navigable waters of the United States, and adjoining
...

shorelines ...
33 U.S.C. § 433(a) (Supp. HI, 1968). See Sweeney, Oil Pollution of the Oceans, 37 FoRDHAM L. REv. 155, 182-83 (1968).
51 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 432, 433 (Supp. 1969) [emphasis added].
52 WATER CONTROL NEws, May 22, 1967, at 2. Participants in the 1967 hearings called
to explore means of dealing more effectively with pollution from vessels were on notice
of the lack of enforceability inherent in the Senate-passed definition of the word "discharge." Water Pollution Hearings 1. According to the Department of Justice, the language, which in effect exempted accidental spillage, made prosecutions under the Act
virtually impossible. WATER CONTROL NEWS, Dec. 18, 1967, at 1. See also Edwards, The
Legislative Approach to Air and Water Quality, NATuRAL REsouRcvs LAw., Jan. 1968, at
58, 65, 66. In fact, between enactment of the provision by the 89th Congress and water
pollution hearings by the 90th there were no cases under the Act. Water Pollution Hearings 249.
The difficulty in obtaining effective enforcement of the limited existing international
control measures has in some instances been employed as an argument against more
stringent United States legislation. The argument has been that no useful purpose is
served by American adherence to higher standards in view of the lack of observance and
enforcement by other nations, and that voluntary arrangements by industry suffice. Nanda,
supra note 29, at 410. In fact the United States for years delayed enacting the Oil Pollution Act of 1961, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1001-15 (1964), the implementing legislation of the IMCO
agreement created at the London Conference of 1954.
53 33 U.S.C. §§ 1001-15 (1964).
54 It contains a general prohibition against discharge of oil or oily mixtures (33
U.S.C. § 1002 (1964)) with the exception of certain discharges chiefly relating to securing
the safety of the ship, preventing damage to the ship or its cargo, the saving of life at
sea, or unavoidable leakage. 33 U.S.C. § 1003 (1964). Penalties may be levied against both
the ship and the responsible parties. 83 U.S.C. § 1005 (1964). An oil record book is provided to each vessel; in it must be logged all discharges, as outlined in the section. 33
U.S.C. § 1010 (1964). Provision is included for examination of these books (in practice by
the Coast Guard) and for forwarding of complaints or reports of violations by foreign
ships to the country of registry. Id. See Water Pollution Hearings 258.
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A bill introduced in the 1969 congressional
could serve
as an example of effective national legislation and possibly as a model
for future international agreements. The bill prohibits "any spilling
(or other dispersal)"'56 of oil and establishes stiffer penalties than
existing legislation for willful or negligent, violation; problems of
enforcement are simplified by making the origination of oil in or
around an offshore installation a prima facie case against the owner.5 7
When discharged oil reaches the shorelines of the United States, the
offending party must either remove it or cause it to be removed or
reimburse the United States for the cost of removal.58 A revolving fund
would be established for cleanup costs, and any sums collected by the
United States as compensation for cleanups would be paid into it.59
B. International Approaches
1. Partial Success in Curbing Tanker Pollution
Jurisdiction over activities on the high seas has traditionally been
vested in the state of flag. This allocation of authority affords little protection against pollution, since the state of flag may be untroubled

by pollution and may appreciate the advantages laxity of regulation
gives it in shipping circles. 60 Jurisdiction by state of registration also
raises the danger that a state threatened or damaged by tanker spillage
outside its territorial waters will resort to extreme measures of selfhelp. For example, after Great Britain bombed the hull of the Torrey
Canyon 61 Prime Minister Wilson announced, "We are certainly not
going to wait for international agreement on the question of approaches to our shores. The old concept of territorial waters is not
enough. 6 2
55 Water Quality Improvement Bill of 1969, S. 7, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). The bill
incorporates the major provisions of 2 earlier bills that were defeated. Senator Muskie,
the sponsor of all 3 bills, blamed the defeat of the first 2 bills on the lobbyists. See N.Y.
Times, Oct. 25, 1968, at 46, col. 1. But see an industry statement to the effect that the
American Petroleum Institute supported the bills' core proposals, such as criminal penalties for willful or grossly negligent spillage, severe civil penalties for any discharge except
one caused by Act of God, and the granting of authority to the federal government to
recover cleanup costs from owners and operators. The industry allegedly demurred at
"hastily drawn" amendments never discussed in hearings. N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1968, at
46, col. 8.
56 S. 7, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. § 12(a)(2) (1969) (emphasis added).
57 Id. §§ 12(i)(1), (2).
58 Id. §§ 12(e), (f), ().
59 Id. § 12(k)(2).
60 See The Oil Around Us 112.
61 There is uncertainty as to whether the British action was justified under customary
international law. There was at least the possibility of a claim by the owners against the
United Kingdom for damages. N.Y. Times, March 29, 1967, at 1, col. 3.
62 N.Y. Times, April 4, 1967, at 12, col. 4.
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Steps toward international regulation of high seas activities were
taken in 1954, when the London Conference promulgated the International Convention for the Prevention of the Pollution of the Sea
by Oil.63 Signed by twenty nations, the Convention established a
number of prohibited zones in which dumping is forbidden; amendments added in 1962 enlarged some of the critical zones, expanded
the classes of ships covered, 64 and reinforced the penalties and enforcement procedures.6 5
The Convention is a salutary step forward in international cooperation, but it is not an effective means of combatting dumping
at sea. Detection of spills in close enough proximity to a ship to
implicate it is difficult.66 In addition, the enforcement procedure is
awkward; violation reports must be forwarded through diplomatic
channels to the state of flag, 67 and if no settlement is agreed upon,
the only resort is to litigation in an international forum. Finally,
the Convention suffers a weakness common to all measures arrived at
by individual states: it applies only to ships registered by the signatories and is unenforceable outside their territorial waters.
2. Inadequacies of Continental Shelf Regulation
Problems associated with the definition of the continental shelf
make it difficult to posit standards under which states may protect
themselves from pollution or responsibility be assigned for its control. Unilateral occupation of the shelves by coastal states68 prompted
the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea to draft the
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 69 in 1958. The Con63 See McDoUGAL & BURKE 1089.

64 The tanker size limit, for example, was lowered from 500 tons to 150 tons. Water
Pollution Hearings 130, 158.

65 Id. at 138-39, 165-67.
66 Ships avoid compliance out of self-interest. "This pollution has a simple economic
base: Tankers must clear their tankers [sic] and the oily scum which is removed must be
put somewhere." WATER CONTROL NEws, Sept. 25, 1967, at 1, 5.
67 Water Pollution Hearings 258-59.

68 For example, the United States claimed title to its continental shelf under the
Truman Proclamation of 1945. Proclamation 2667, September 28, 1945 (59 Stat. 884). By
1956, 20 nations had made claims similar to that of the United States, and 88 states
signed the 1958 convention which accorded general recognition to the concept. Hearn,
The Role of the Navy in the Formulation of FederalPolicy Regarding the Sea, NArUARA
LAw., June 1968, at 23, 28. See generally Morris, Oil and Gas Legal Problems
on the North Sea Continental Shelf, NATuRAL RrsouRcEs LAW., Jan. 1968, at 1.

Rrsou css

69 [1964] 1 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311. Three other conventions
were drafted at the Conference: the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1607, T.LA.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; the Convention on the
High Seas, [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2313, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; and the Convention
on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, [1966] 1 U.S.T.
139, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 599 U.N.T.S. 285.
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vention attempted to codify and lend some international legislative
recognition to the movement for occupation; its so-called "exploitability test," 70 however, is fast becoming inadequate.
Technological advances may soon make every part of the seabed
exploitable. 71 The United States, for example, has already granted
a substantial number of leases lying outside the Geneva Convention's
alternate limit of the 200-meter bathymetric contour line.7 2 One
danger of the exploitability test is that it enables technologically advanced states to make extensive claims at the expense of the less
developed states.1 3 Another problem is the lack of any means to
resolve a conflict if an area of seabed may legitimately be claimed to
lie off the shore of more than one state and each is able to exploit it.
Arguably, some conflicts could be resolved on the basis of the disputed
area's greater geographical unity with one claimant's shelf area, 74
but this principle is embodied in neither the Convention nor customary international law.7 5
[T]he term "continental shelf" is used as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of
the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of such areas ....
[1964] 1 U.S.T. 471, 473, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, 312.
71 Belman, The Role of the State Department in Formulating Federal Policy Regarding Marine Resources, NATURAL. RsouRcrs LAw., June 1968, at 14; Goldie, The Exploitability Test-Interpretation and Potentialities, 8 NATURAL RESoURCES J. 434, 437
(1968).
72 UsEs OF THE SEAs 80; see Christy, Marine Resources and the Freedom of the Seas,
8 NATURAL R.SOURCS J. 424, 427, 431 (1969). For lists and maps of leased tracts in California grouped according to whether they are located above, partly below, or entirely
below the 600-foot bathymetric contour line, see Goldie, supra note 71, at 462-76.
The Secretary of Interior has refused no leases on the grounds that the depths were
too great or the area too far from shore. As to the ultimate limits of jurisdiction, the
Solicitor of the Department of Interior has said:
You may want to know whether the Department has decided on a line beyond
which it will not lease, or whether it has decided to lease as far out as anyone
might suggest. The answer on both counts is no.
Barry, The Administration of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, NATuRAL REsouRcEs
LAw., July 1968, at 38, 47. It was suggested that cases would be approached on an individual basis. Id. To date, United States sales of leases for actual recovery, as opposed to
exploratory work, have all been on the West Coast, perhaps due to the fact that extension
of seabed sovereignty even to Hawaii might not present an international problem; the
United States has been wary of granting exclusive oil and gas claims in the Gulf of
Mexico. Goldie, supra, at 453.
73 Goldie, supra note 71, at 437.
74 See id. for a criticism of the exploitability test on the ground it bears no "verisimilitude to geographical facts."
75 The United Kingdom, however, recognizes continental shelf rights in Norway
beyond the deep Norwegian trench separating shallower areas of the North Sea from
the mainland. Id. at 465.
70
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Even if definitional problems could be cleared away, it is not
clear that national control over shelf operations is a viable solution
to the pollution problem. National control makes the safety of other
states depend on the willingness of the licensing state to safeguard
itself from pollution, and the licensing state may well consider that
interest outweighed by other factors. The revenues, balance of payments advantages, and other values accruing from petroleum exploitation may make a state only too eager to encourage offshore
operations without regard to anti-pollution precautions.
Moreover, national control does not assure an adequate balancing
of interests in exploitation of the seabed and uses of the superjacent
high seas. The Convention on the Continental Shelf and the Convention on the High Seas recognize both the "sovereignty" of the
coastal state over its continental shelf and a principle of non-interference by the coastal state with the uses of the high seas, 76 but this
is an unrealistic position. 77 Offshore operations with permanent and
quasi-permanent installations will inevitably create some disruption
of other uses of the seas. The North Sea, for example, covers a large
underwater oil field, contains sea lanes to Europe's major ports, and
76 "The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources." Convention on the Continental
Shelf, supra note 69, art. 2, § 1. "The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf
do not affect the legal status of the superjacent waters as high seas, or that of the airspace above those waters." Id. art. 3. The Convention specifically warns against interfer-

ence with navigation, fishing, conservation of the living resources of the sea, or oceanographic or scientific research aimed at adding to the world's store of publicly available
literature. Id. art. 5, §§ 1, 7. Article 24 of the Convention on the High Seas, supra note
69, contains parallel provisions.
A stronger position, urged upon the International Law Commission but not adopted,
suggested establishment of a contiguous zone of 200 sea miles adjacent to every coastal
state within which that state would be empowered to enforce regulations to protect the
resources of its adjacent seas from oil pollution. 1955 Y.B. INT'L L. COMm'N, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/Ser.A/1950, at 78. The proposal that was incorporated in the final report called
upon all states to draw up regulations to prevent discharge of fuel oils from ships. Id.
Later changes substituted "oil" for "fuel oil" and added exploitation resulting in pollution
and pollution from radioactivity. 1956 Y.B. ITr'L L. COMm'N, Vol. I, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SERA/1956/Add. 1, 58, 59, 59-63.
For a history of League of Nations and United Nations work dealing with pollution
of the sea by oil, see generally United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Official
Records, Pollution of the Sea by Oil (Prep. Doc. No. 8) U.N. A/CONF. 13/8.
77 See, e.g., 1955 Y.B. INT'L L. Comm'N, Vol. I, supra note 76, where the special rapporteur contended that the article dealing with water pollution was comparable to those
dealing with maritime safety and the use of signals in that it was highly technical. It
would be impossible for the Commission to examine all the problems in detail but rather
conceivable only that the ILC lay down general guidelines. Id. at 49.
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is one of the world's most valuable fishing zones. 1 Mineral exploration threatens to pollute the fishing grounds and obstruct navigation.
The issue to be resolved is what degree of interference can be tolerated, and it is not clear that the coastal state will give appropriate
weight to the interests of other nations.
CONCLUSION

Existing systems of regulation provide inadequate protection
against pollution because they vest control in the state having the
least interest in anti-pollution measures. Governments have been
needlessly miserly in their willingness to surrender either a measure
of their autonomy or a part of their fiscal resources to obtain the
long-range benefits of clean seas and shores.
One answer to the pollution threat from tanker operations might
be further to broaden the discretion of the coastal state to exercise its
jurisdiction under the objective territorial theory of international
law. 79 Expansion of contiguous zones such as the International Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) safety zones8 ° and creation
of authority in a state to take direct action against a source of pollution at sea8 l would enable it better to safeguard its shores and territorial waters.8 2 Because this proposal casts the coastal state as the
78 See map delimitation of the various national shelf boundaries in the North Sea of
the United Kingdom, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, and Norway in Morris, supra
note 68, at 8.
79 See note on bases of jurisdiction in W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAw 463-68 (1962).
80 See notes 63-65 and accompanying text supra.
81 Water Pollution Hearings 206. There was some doubt expressed as to whether the
United States, under existing international law, could impose liability on a foreign vessel
50 to 100 miles offshore even though these prohibited zones were established by IMCO
in the 1962 Convention. The jurisdiction of the United States to enact legislation covering
accidental spillage would probably be strictly confined to its 3-mile territorial waters or a
12-mile contiguous zone. Id. The International Law Commission's Commentary to Article
27 of the Convention on the High Seas (supra note 69) which defines freedom of the high
seas, reads that "[N]o state may subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty; hence
no state may exercise jurisdiction over any stretch of water." The conclusion that absence
of jurisdiction follows from absence of the broader authority of sovereignty is, however, a
non sequitur. McDOUGAL & BuRKE 84. The result of this "conceptual rigidity" is to ignore
the relativity of all uses and interests in the sea and to remove flexibility in dealing with
legitimate claims of states to apply authority for limited purposes over non-territorial
seas. Id.
82 Water Pollution Hearings 12, 205. A tanker could, for example, be required to
receive a certificate showing that it had cleaned its tanks in port in order to clear the
port. Although the United States could probably establish such a procedure unilaterally,
a preferred approach would be to seek strengthening amendments to the IMCO Convention. Id. at 11.
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victim and the high seas user as the offender, however, it cannot be
extended to shelf operations; when shelf exploitation goes awry and
pollutes the superjacent waters and surrounding shores, it is the
coastal state and its licensees that create the damage and the other
littoral states and high seas users that suffer the loss. Stricter international control by treaty, on the other hand, is a solution applicable
to either tankers or shelf operations.
Any viable system of regulating shelf operations presupposes an
answer to the difficult policy problem of preserving all uses of the
seas to the maximum extent possible consistent with "reasonable
measures of exploitation."8 8 The approaching meeting of the IMCO8 4
provides a unique opportunity for consideration of these questions
under the aegis of a United Nations agency. The IMCO should,
therefore, expand its area of concern beyond tanker pollution to encompass the existing and impending problems of the continental
shelf.
One option logically open to the IMCO is to prohibit offshore
drilling altogether. In a world where oil reserves are relatively plentiful
and food supplies increasingly scarce, such a move would be farsighted;
the economic stakes involved, however, make it politically impractical.8 5 A more realistic expectation is that the conference will define
international standards of liability for offshore accidents 88 and establish
an international agency 7 to enforce regulations and award compensation for pollution damage. To insure compensation, both the private
83 McDouGAL & Bu=K 691. See also Young, Offshore Claims and Problems in the
North Sea, 59 Am. J. oF INT'L L. 505, 518-22 (1965), for a discussion of the problems of

competing uses and the concept of "unjustifiable interference."
84 The IMCO is the smallest of the United Nations specialized agencies and has an
operating budget of approximately $1 million, which is funded by the maritime states
on a pro rata basis. The 69 member nations with interests in world maritime affairs
consider such items as international conventions, ship design, safety, transport facilitation,
and safety of navigation. N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1968, at 80, col. 3.
85 Such a decision is not unheard of on a unilateral basis, however. The Ohio
Department of Natural Resources deferred indefinitely plans for leasing of underwater
acreage in Lake Erie because of the danger that seepage would add to the already polluted
condition of the lake. The decision was made despite the expectation that annual state
revenues from the project would have run as high as $1 million. WATa CoNTROL NEWs,
March 11, 1968, at 11.
86 As to liability at customary international law for pollution injury to a neighboring
state, see BIsHop, supra note 79, at 343-45: "[D]uties grounded in the exclusive jurisdiction of States ..

. [include] the obligation to prevent . .. its territory from causing

economic injury to neighboring territory . . . "' Id. at 344. A leading international law
case upholding recovery for the United States for air pollution from a Canadian smelter
is Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal, 33 Am. J. INT'L LAW 182 (1939).
87 See Nanda, supra note 29, at 406.
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companies and the licensing state should be held accountable to
nations and private parties injured by pollution;88 holding the licensing government responsible is consistent with its heavy financial
interest in offshore drilling.8 9
A central issue will be whether strict liability should be imposed
on continental shelf activities. 90 The United-States oil industry has
argued that imposition of such "onerous liability" in the absence of
fault is "contrary to the fundamental tenets of Anglo-American jurisprudence." 91 The rigors of strict liability would be mitigated, however,
if the nations developing their offshore lands established an insurance
fund or an "international tax" on recovery of minerals from the seabed. This could be used to underwrite cleanup costs and as a fund to
compensate injured parties.92 The windfalls to national treasuries resulting from the opening of the underwater domain of the continental
shelves should make a farsighted international community willing to
dedicate a portion of these monies on a national pro rata basis to an
93
international insurance fund.

Dennis M. O'Connell
88 A satisfactory international solution could be modeled upon some of the provisions
of the United States Water quality Improvement Bill of 1969. See notes 55-59 and
accompanying text supra.
89 For example, it was determined that, in reporting a $6 billion spending reduction
ordered by Congress, a $300 million "savings" that was included was accounted for by an
unexpectedly large flow of royalty payments from offshore oil leases which count as an
offset against expenditures. N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1968, at 1, col. 3 and id. at 26, col. 5.
The Government of the Netherlands was expected to take such a large percentage of the
revenues from North Sea fields through direct participation (40%), royalties (8-16%), and
taxes that only the large fields might prove to be profitable. See Gardner, supra note 28,
at 66.
90 The leading common law case imposing strict liability for the escape of dangerous
substances is Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 1 Exch. 265 (Ex. 1866). But see the equally famous
Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'r Co. (The "Wagon Mound Case'),
1 All E.R. 404 (P.C. 1961), applying the "foreseeability" test. For a discussion of these
and other common law and admiralty decisions, see Nanda, supra note 29, at 415-18;
Sweeney, supra note 50, at 164-81.
91 Water Pollution Hearings 19.
92 A limited program of self-insurance has already been initiated by a private group
of oil tanker operators. OIL & GAs J., Nov. 18, 1968, at 108. Although these private efforts
are commendable, the amounts in controversy in damage claims after a major disaster
may far outrun the ability of private concerns to spread the loss. The coverage would be
$100/gross registered ton for tanker spillage, up to a maximum of $10 million per ship
per accident. N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1969, at 93, col. 1.
I3 There is some domestic precedent for such contribution. Conservationists were
successful in their fight to tap a substantial portion of federal revenues from offshore lands
for conservation purposes. N.Y. Times, July 13, 1968, at 17, col. 1. The revolving fund
proposed for cleanup costs in the Water Quality Improvement Bill of 1969 also seems to
accord with the philosophy of this proposal. S. 7, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 12(k)(2) (1969).

